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Abstract 
Although current studies into Chinese food supply and quality provide explanations for the causality 
of food problems, there is limited inquiry into the role of the county government. This is a serious 
omission for two main reasons: first, because county governments perform a key role in providing 
support for farmers through agricultural extension services and farmers’ cooperatives, and second, 
because county-level administrative divisions are central to developing novel instruments to manage 
supply chain relationships, such as food production standards. We investigate the key players 
involved in standard making and delivery at the county level. We also analyse how and why the 
county government engages in standard-setting activities. We use Lin’an’s bamboo shoot production 
industry as a case study to understand how the local state implements “hazard-free,” “green” and 
“forest food” production standards. The paper concludes that traditional conceptualizations of the 
local state do not sufficiently address how nature, knowledge of standards and state authority co-
produce institutional capacity to control food supply and quality in China. In practice, the local state 
engages with non-state actors to achieve superficial environmental efforts, such as developing food 
production standards to throw a “green cloak” over a productivist model. 
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Since the market reforms of the late 1970s, China’s economy and social structure have 
been transformed. While understandably much attention has been given to 
industrialization and urbanization,
1
 the rural transition has also been profound. Rural 
enterprises have become integrated into global economic networks, which have, in turn, 
transformed domestic socio-economic landscapes and natural environments.
2
 An 
increasingly urbanized and affluent Chinese middle class is raising concerns about food 
quality and supply, including issues with milk powder contaminated with melamine, and 
recycled oil and toxic chemical usage in the food production system.
3
 Although current 
studies into food supply and quality provide different explanations for the causality of 
food problems,
4
 there has so far been limited inquiry into the role of the local state. This 
is a serious omission. First, because the local state performs a key role in providing 
support for farmers (for example, agricultural extension services), and second, the 
county-level administrative division is central to developing novel instruments to manage 
supply chain relationships (for example, food production standards). It is important to 
know more about the key players involved in standard making and delivery at county 
level. We also need to understand how and why the local state engages in standard-
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setting activities. This study uses a case study of the county of Lin’an 临安县 and its 
bamboo shoot production industry to investigate how the local state implements “hazard-
free,” “green” and “forest food” production standards. The growing importance of 
standards in public policy is an under-researched area, especially in reference to China.
5
  
A detailed analysis of standards in rural China is important for three reasons. First, 
it provides a lens through which to examine the dynamics of the relationship between the 
local state and market and how those dynamics are changing over time.
6
 From the 
perspective of the local state in Lin’an, the imperative is to increase its territorial reach so 
as to expand the domestic and international markets for Lin’an’s bamboo shoots. Growth 
in the reach of the local state is, however, constantly threatened by internal and external 
pressures. A key internal tension arises from the increased intensification of bamboo 
farming, which has the potential to further exacerbate soil degradation, while an 
increasingly important external tension is consumer demand for higher quality food, 
which may be expressed in multiple ways such as calls for better food safety or a desire 
for artisanal production. Second, the paper highlights the role of the county-level 
administrative division in economic development and policy delivery. For Lin’an, food 
standards is a form of technical knowledge to serve the local government as it seeks to 
extend its spatial control over bamboo shoot production. Standards act as a spatial fix (for 
example, to control fertilizer usage) to safeguard the quality of the material through the 
supply chain, from the rural bamboo grower to the urban consumer’s plate. The 
implementation of standards also shows a policy commitment to protect the rural 
environment and promote food quality.
7
 Third, we show the extent to which standards 
matter in maintaining a competitive advantage for bamboo shoot growers in Lin’an, and 
thus why state and producer interests are so entangled. Standards are both a means and an 
end to secure a competitive edge. Bamboo shoot standards become a territorial strategy 
for the state to manage nature since they can be used to establish growing practices and to 
publicly demonstrate how a resource can be utilized. Through such an analysis, we can 
show how international environmental neo-liberalism
8
 interacts with Chinese 
governmentality.
9
 One consequence is that bamboo standards could be conceived of as a 
means of putting a “green cloak” over bamboo farmers and the local government.  
We use the term “green cloak” rather than the more market-oriented “green wash” 
because we wish to refer to a specific governance logic of state territorial control over the 
production of nature. By engaging with non-state actors, including experts, academics 
and producers, to apparently apply “greening” efforts, the local state is able to develop a 
new set of production standards to legitimize an apparently “green” productivist model. 
In this productivist model, Lin’an state uses bamboo shoot cultivation to meet the 
environmentally-oriented directives of the National Forest Protection Programme 
(NTFP).
10
 Since the 1980s, the bamboo shoot cultivation area in Lin’an has increased 
rapidly: bamboo forest coverage grew by 92 per cent between 1985 and 2009 (from 2,900 
to 55,777 hectares). As a result of its efforts to increase bamboo growth – and thereby 
“greening” the landscape – Lin’an county is recognized throughout the country as 
China’s “national bamboo homeland” (Zhongguo zhuzi zhi xiang 中国竹子之乡).11 
When we lift the “green cloak” through detailed local analysis, however, the interest in 
standardization by farmers and the local state becomes more instrumental. There remains 
a deep-seated tension between exploitative ways of using resources and environmental 





term economic gains mattering more than conservation for the local state and producers 
and, in turn, the exploitation of natural resources to the detriment of the environment. 
This paper is divided into five further sections. In the next section, we analyse the 
relationships between the local state and food production standards. Then, in the third 
section, we briefly explain our approach to data collection and the reasoning behind our 
selection of bamboo as a material and Lin’an as a county for research. The two sections 
after that report on our empirical material to show how Lin’an county applies “hazard-
free,” “green food” and “forest food” production standards. Finally, we reflect on the 
interactions between different levels of government and the formation and 
implementation of food production standards. We conclude that food production 
standards provide a valuable way to understand the dynamics of the local government 
and an important insight into multi-scalar activities. 
 
Food Production Standards and the Local State 
Commentators have pointed out that standards are an often little noticed but nevertheless 
a remarkable feature of contemporary life.
12
 Creating a standard provides an important 
window through which to examine the authority of states or private actors to influence 
the quality and credibility of production and/or services.
13
 Standards help to regulate 
individual and collective behaviour.
14
 Moreover, as a voluntary policy instrument, 
standards require a legitimacy to be effective. By analysing food standards, we are able to 
gain an insight into the evolving relationship between state and society, and state and 
businesses in rural China. For example, some observers have illustrated how the nexus of 
power-culture embedded in Western food standards has become a new form of 
domination to demand notions of “goodness” and safety in imported food.
15
 Within the 
context of Chinese public policy, there is a growing interest in food standards, principally 
arising from a series of high profile food scares.
16
 The work of Kathleen Buckingham and 
her colleagues on bamboo standards has been particularly instructive, as they have 
documented the ways in which national and international standards matter for 
biodiversity.
17
 Commentators on forest certification also point to how the Chinese state 
tactically engages with non-state actors (academics, forestry experts and producers) and 
third-party certification bodies (the Forest Stewardship Council) to co-produce the 
knowledge needed to develop standards.
18
 This co-produced knowledge enables China’s 




Although current debates on food production standards and forest certification 
provide insights into how the Chinese state collaborates with non-state actors in order to 
meet international requirements and maintain state-centric governance, most attention has 
been on activity on a national level. Researchers have paid less attention to the ways in 
which standards may matter at a local level and the role that the local state plays in 
mobilizing farmers to meet standards.
20
 It is important here to problematize the role of 
the local state:
21
 why might a local state develop its own standards? How does the 
promotion of standards help us to understand the changing role of the local state?  
To begin to answer these questions, we seek to bring together the social, 
economic and political structures that enable bamboo shoot-related stakeholders to 
interact in order to implement standardization policies and programmes. Christopher 





political economy of the bamboo forest and environmental degradation, as these will affect 
the lives of rural people and biodiversity.22 Networks among state officials, processors, 
forestry experts, technicians, research institutions and private agricultural companies, as 
well as with bamboo shoot farmers who perform collaborative roles, define farming 
norms and negotiate standards for bamboo shoot production. In the empirical material 
that follows, we detail how these arrangements work in practice for bamboo shoot 
growers in Lin’an. County government plays a crucial role in increasing farmers’ 
incentives and productivity through regulation and supporting policies.
23
 To deliver 
governmental policies on food standards, agricultural extension systems (for example, 
agro-forestry experts) and farmers’ cooperatives are important information providers that 
can diffuse knowledge and ideas of food and environmental quality.
24
 Even if such 
knowledge is not deemed appropriate by bamboo growers for their day-to-day activities, 
the tendency to comply with rules, regulations and standards prevails, or as Carolyn 




The persistence of state authoritarianism, party-state governance and pro-growth 
pragmatism are central to interpreting current food systems in China.
26
 For our 
perspective, it is important to understand how the local state makes plans, coordinates 
with different state and non-state actors, and utilizes the rights for fiscal autonomy to 
make profits from food production enterprises.
27
 There are two major ways to 
conceptualize the role of the local state in economic development. One perspective is 
promoted by Marc Blecher and Vivienne Shue, who employ the concept of a 
developmental state to analyse how a local state (i.e. county-level government) plays 
direct and indirect roles to “plan, finance, and implement developmental projects.”
28
 The 
developmental state thesis argues that a strong central state creates favourable conditions 
for processes of economic restructuring in newly industrializing countries (NICs) such as 
Japan, South Korea, and Singapore. The role of the local state is to support the activities 
of companies as best as it can, including identifying those companies or sectors which are 
most likely to be successful. The developmental state model is helpful in explaining why 
the Lin’an county government would be so supportive of the bamboo shoot industry: it is 
economically and culturally significant.
29
 The model may also provide a tentative answer 
as to why a local state should be involved in delivering on national standards as well as 
promoting its own standards. This is because the Lin’an bamboo industry is already 
highly competitive, and standards could help to protect its domestic markets from lower 
quality competitors and assist it to gain access to international markets. A potential 
weakness in the argument is that there is little evidence to show that local producers and 
processors – the entrepreneurs who are to be supported – made any requests for standards 
to support or enhance their competitive position. 
A second perspective is that of the “entrepreneurial state,” proposed by Jean Oi 
and Andrew Walder.
30
 Both Oi and Walder see a local state as acting like an entrepreneur. 
For instance, local government leaders perform the role of a board of directors in a 
company to make profits from township village enterprises (TVEs), and sell land to 
maximize extra revenue for local government expenses and retain tax earnings.
31
 For Oi, 
“local government coordinates economic enterprises in its territories as if it were a 
diversified business corporation.”
32
 In contrast to the developmental state model, which 





in local government because officials will wish to expand revenue-generating activities, 
and especially the “extraction of profits from enterprises.”
33
 To promote successful 
enterprises, local governments can exercise control over factory management, offer 
privileged access to resources (for example, raw materials), provide investment and credit, 
and make available bureaucratic services (for example, prizes).
34
 The latter would also 
include certification and provide an important insight into why the “entrepreneurial state” 
would be interested in promoting standardization: by entangling state and nominally 
private interests, bureaucrats would be using a state-supported instrument to endorse and 
give their firms a competitive advantage. In this model, the local state will innovate to 
provide support mechanisms to enable firms to flourish. Oi’s work also distinguishes 
between entrepreneurially economically successful rural areas, such as Lin’an, and those 
that fall behind. Rather problematic, though, is how the model of the entrepreneurial state 
can bring together a sectoral perspective – in this case, bamboo – with a scalar 
perspective to suggest a geography of the local state that can offer an understanding of 
how nationally and locally formulated standards compete with or complement one 
another in specific places, such as Lin’an. What do national standards mean to producers, 
processors and bureaucrats at the local level? And how might locally developed standards 
be scaled up from the county level to the provincial level? 
Part of the reason why both the developmental state and entrepreneurial state 
models fail to sufficiently incorporate the potential significance of a novel policy 
instrument, such as a standard, is that they overemphasize state-driven transformation 
processes, which results in an unduly static understanding of state–market relations.
35
 
Instead, Cartier explores how state power is shaped and reshaped in a dynamic way, 
where the local state employs territorial strategies (for example, direct investment and 
rearrangement of its administrative organization) to extend its governing capacity and 
authoritarian power.
36
 By adopting a more dynamic understanding of how a local state 
extends its control and rule on bamboo shoot standards through localized production 
networks, we can analyse how a county-level state expands its direct and indirect rules 
through standardization processes. Here, we can explore interactions with other rural 
areas. For instance, standards can be caught up in competition between rural areas, as 
local states seek to promote their bamboo shoot industries. Rural areas may also be 
engaged in exploitative relations with one another. For example, bamboo growers in the 
neighbouring county of Anji 安吉 import bamboo supplies from elsewhere. These are 
then processed to maximize the value added from the cachet of the Anji name.
37
 We can 
also examine interactions with urban areas, because bamboo shoots are a material for 
urban consumers. Standards provide one way of bringing together through a supply chain 
(from producer to consumer) knowledge and expectations of a product. Moreover, by 
exploring how standards operate in practice we can see how the national state intrudes 
into a rural area, and also how a local state can seek to project itself beyond its rural area. 
For example, the county-level standard developed in Lin’an has a symbolism that spreads 
well beyond the community. At a time when changing administrative boundaries is 
commonplace, to extend or defend a rural economic space can be of paramount 









Bamboo has enormous cultural significance in China. It is one of the four most admired 
plants in the country.
39
 Economically, bamboo is one of the fastest expanding forest-land 
crops in China – there are approximately 7 million hectares of bamboo forest – and the 
industry is estimated to be worth about US$5.4bn a year.
40
 In many respects, bamboo has 
the features of a classic sustainable material: it is natural, grows rapidly and can do so 
with limited or no inputs, can substitute for more environmentally damaging materials 
(such as plastics, fibres or wood), and produces limited waste. 
The traditional markets for bamboo products are handicrafts, chopsticks and 
bamboo shoots (food). Emergent markets, with the greatest added value, include furniture 
and flooring.
41
 There is not only domestic demand for bamboo products but also 
significant export markets. This study focuses on bamboo shoots as a food, because 
standards in this area most clearly bring together producers, processors and consumers. 
As shown below, there are international, national and locally developed standards that 
apply to bamboo shoots. Lin’an county in Zhejiang province (see Figure 1), was selected 
as the geographical focus for research on the standardization of bamboo shoots owing to 
three major factors.
42
 First, it is well known for its bamboo knowledge and has a long 
history of bamboo shoot production that dates back to the 15th century. Lin’an county is 
the biggest bamboo shoot production hub in China. Second, the local state uses bamboo 
shoot production as a means of providing ecological services (for example, managing soil 
erosion by encouraging bamboo planting, see below) and socio-economic functions (e.g. 
stabilize farmers’ livelihoods), which provides a lens to evaluate the steering approaches 
and policy implementation of production standards. Third, the bamboo shoot production 
industry is a crucial part of the mountain economy. In Lin’an county, around 50 per cent 
of farmers’ incomes derives from bamboo shoots. While more than 60 types of bamboo 
are grown within Lin’an county, there are three major types of bamboo shoots: Moso 
Phyllostachys (Ph.) Edulis (maozhu sun 毛竹笋); Phyllostachys (Ph.) Praecox (leizhu 
sun 雷竹笋); and Phyllostachys (Ph.) Nuda (shezhu sun 石竹笋). The selection and 
specialization of these three types of bamboo shoot stems from decisions made during the 
1980s by the Lin’an Forestry Bureau. It wished to encourage farmers to grow bamboo 
shoots based on different slope gradients. For instance, on slopes with gradients lower 
than 20 degrees, farmers were encouraged to grow Ph. Praecox bamboo shoots; where 
the slope gradient was greater than 20 degrees, farmers were encouraged to grow Ph. 
Nuda bamboo shoots.
43
 In Lin’an, similar to its neighbouring county of Anji, the 
increasing specialization in bamboo has meant an increase in the area of bamboo 
forestland, with a consequent loss of needle leaf and broadleaf forests.
44
 The tendency to 
promote the monoculture of bamboo has important implications for biodiversity.
45
 
Owing to their different seasonalities, these three major shoot types provide fresh 
shoots for the wholesale market for a longer time period and also appeal to different users. 
Moso and Ph. Praecox shoots are sold on the fresh shoot market or processed and canned. 
Ph. Nuda shoots, on the other hand, are used for dried bamboo shoot products. In 2006, 
the bamboo shoot industry in Lin’an produced 35,000 tonnes of bamboo shoots and 
generated an economic value of around 160 million yuan.
46
 There are around 5,000 
traders involved in bamboo shoot transportation and marketing. They bring the fresh 
shoots to wholesalers in Changzhou 常州, Shanghai, Nanjing, Jiaxing 嘉兴, Shaoxing 绍









Figure 1: Map Showing the Location of Lin’an County 
 
Source: Map produced by the author - Kin Wing Chan  
 
The empirical base for the analysis in this article has been collected and built up 
over a period of time using a range of secondary (archival materials) and primary data 
collected through interviews and field visits to Lin’an. Empirical research was conducted 
in 2011 and 2012. During this time, in-depth interviews were undertaken with forestry 
bureau officials, farmers’ cooperative representatives, processors, bamboo shoot farmers, 
forestry technicians and Zhejiang Agricultural and Forestry University researchers. In-
depth interviews were conducted across national, provincial and county levels of forestry 
officials to understand how standards are delivered and implemented from central to 
county level. Archival materials in relation to bamboo shoot production standards were 
obtained from the State Forestry Administration, the International Network for Bamboo 
and Rattan (INBAR) in Beijing, and Lin’an Forestry Bureau. 
 
International and Chinese Standards for Bamboo Shoot Processing 
China became a member of the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001. As with those 
countries in the West that have been caught up in the neo-liberal political economy, the 
demands of the international market have driven China’s Ministry of Agriculture also to 
institutionalize and monitor the processing standards of food products.
48
 According to 





to be in compliance with international food safety laws.
49
 In Lin’an, the Product Quality 
Monitoring Group (PQMG) in the Lin’an Bamboo Shoot Processing Association 
(LBSPA) monitor two major standards for bamboo shoot processing: (1) an international 
standard for local-led processors which meets overseas market requirements, and (2) 
China’s standard for local-led processors and small local processors (see Table 1). 
 






AQSIQ is the General Administration for Quality Supervision, Inspection and Quarantine in 
China. This organization is a ministerial-level body under the State Council and is in charge of import–
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53
 (food safety) standards are 
crucial for export-oriented processors to follow (see Table 1). In Lin’an, over ten bamboo 
shoot processing firms have obtained HACCP certification and ISO9001 certification.
54
 
The HACCP, as it applies in Lin’an, is a systematic preventative approach to regulate and 
control chemical usage and biological and physical hazards in the production and 
processing of fresh bamboo shoots.
55
 The JAS standard requires bamboo shoot processors 
to comply with standards pertaining to production, processing procedures, import 
clearance, inspection certificates, containers and packaging.
56
 Both Japanese and overseas 
accreditors can certify bamboo shoot processors with the JAS.
57
 In order to help local-led 
processors meet international standards, the Lin’an Forestry Bureau and the Lin’an 
Bamboo Shoots Processing Association provide them with links to “hazard-free” bamboo 
shoot producers.  
When describing the effectiveness with which the local state regulates processors 
to ensure that they comply with both international and national production and processing 
standards, the chair of the Bamboo Shoot Processing Association distinguished between 
markets and farmers:  
 
Mostly, the local-led processing firms can fulfil both national and international standards because their 
products have to sell to international markets and they have a stricter food quality control and assurance 
system. For instance, the Japanese food quality standard is very strict; if the Japanese customer found a hair 
in any bamboo shoot products, the whole container load has to go back to China. For the internal market, 
monitoring is a problem: we cannot ensure that those small processors comply with hygiene and chemical 




There is a hierarchy of regulatory practice. Those at the top are producing for and 
selling to international markets. These firms are supported in their efforts to comply with 
standards. Beneath them are those firms who can produce for a national market and meet 
national standards. Beneath these firms are smaller companies who target domestic 
consumers, fall outside of the standards and are beyond both the regulatory and 
supportive arrangements of the local state. As long as the small, unregulated processing 
firms stay out of the public gaze, they do not tarnish Lin’an’s reputation for quality, 
which depends on the high-profile exporting companies. The county’s reputation for 
quality is also – and even more significantly – dependent upon its bamboo shoot growers, 
and it is their interaction with standards that we now examine.  
 
Bamboo Shoot Production Standards 
In 2009, a Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress enacted the Republic 
of China’s Food Safety Law. To help implement the law, further regulations and 
standards have been developed at sub-national level. For bamboo shoot growers in Lin’an, 
three are particularly important: the Hazard-Free Production Standard (Wugonghai shipin 
shengchan biaozhun 无公害食品生产标准, HFPS), the Green Food Production Standard 
(Lüse shipin shengchan biaozhun 绿色食品生产标准, GFPS), and the Zhejiang Province 
Forest Food Production Base Standard (Zhejiang sheng senlin shipin shengchan biaozhun 
浙江省森林食品生产标准, ZFFPBS) (see Table 2). The standards are set and evaluated 





The HFPS and GFPS are the responsibility of the Zhejiang Agricultural Department, and 
the ZFFPBS is issued by the State Forestry Administration Forestry Products Quality 
Inspection and Testing Centre (Hangzhou). The competition between departments is 
typical of that found in Chinese bureaucracy.
59
 
The HFPS requires that farmers meet the following criteria: (1) chemical 
fertilizers should be maintained at safe levels; (2) the surrounding areas of the agro-
forestry production lands should fulfil hazard-free standards; and (3) the production 
procedures, processing, packaging, storage and transport should reach hazard-free 
agricultural product standards. The standard does not seem particularly difficult to fulfil 
because, according to a Lin’an Forestry Department (aligned to the provincial 
government) technician, “most of our farmers fulfil the hazard-free standards.”
60
 The 
Green Food Standard makes more stringent demands on the use of toxic chemical 
fertilizers and the quantity of chemical residue in agricultural products.  
The local state is making considerable efforts to promote the Green Food 
Standard to distinguish Lin’an products in a competitive market place, but where 
fertilizers are embedded in local farming practice that is difficult.
61
 As the same forestry 
department technician explained: “we are working hard to help farmers realize the 
practices of green food production standards. It takes time and financial resources to 
propel the green food standards because the requirements are hard to meet with the 
current knowledge and financial resources of farmers.”
62
 
The Forest Food Production Base Standard (FFPBS) is popular in Zhejiang. To 
differentiate its standard from those of the provincial agricultural department (i.e. 
Hazard-Free and Green Good standards), the Zhejiang Provincial Forestry Department 
set up its own forest food product base standard (the ZFFPBS). This pays more attention 
to forest biodiversity, forest coverage, forest structure, soil condition, air quality and 
water quality. By demonstrating the legitimacy of the ZFFPBS to its users, Zhejiang has 
“promoted” a provincial standard to a national level. The national-level Forest Food 
Standard, like that for Zhejiang, stresses “forest sustainability.” However, the national-
level standard is more rigorous in that it promotes “product branding,” emphasizes 
“organic” or “natural” production without the use of artificial pesticides and fertilizers, 
and provides for traceability throughout the supply chain, from place of production to the 
plate. Such a stringent form of production is beyond the means of Lin’an bamboo shoot 
growers, which is why the province is so keen to legitimize its own standard. 
Lin’an county, like the Zhejiang Provincial Forestry Department, has also proved 
to be innovative. Led by Lin’an forestry experts and technicians, who have considerable 
expertise in bamboo cultivation and processing, standards were developed based on the 
Ministry of Agriculture’s Hazard-Free Production and Zhejiang’s Non-Environmental 
Pollution Bamboo Shoot (DB33/333/1-2001). In 2009, the Lin’an Forestry Bureau issued 
the Ph. Praecox Bamboo Shoots Soil Rehabilitation Standard (DB3301/T199-2011) (see 
Table 2). This production standard regulates the terminology for forestry management 
and pest and disease controls for bamboo. The purpose of the standard is to encourage 
soil rehabilitation of degraded soil. However, county-level standards are relatively loose 
and the certification, traceability and period of validity of bamboo shoot products are 
ambiguous. As we show below, the standards do little to challenge the increasing 












   
Table 2. National, provincial and county levels food standards for bamboo shoot growers 








Year established 2001 1990 2015 2007 2009 
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Residue testing Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
Certifiers and cost 
 
Ministry of Agriculture 
Centre for Agri-Food 
Quality and Safety: no 
certificate fee 
 
Ministry of Agriculture 
Centre for Agri-Food 
Quality and Safety: 















































From provincial to local level: implementing bamboo shoot production standards in 
Lin’an 
 
Fresh bamboo shoots are a local specialty, and one that is increasingly being exploited. 
For example, farmers and processors make reference to the geographical origin of their 
bamboo shoots at the source of Lake Tai 太湖 and Mount Tianmu 天目山 in Lin’an (see 
the example of the Kao Yuen Bamboo Shoot Cooperative below). Farmers use these 
images to conjure up powerful cultural messages for urban consumers of a typical 
Chinese mountainous climate with clean water. Moreover, the bamboo shoot farmers are 
associated with traditional artisan cultivation, harvesting and processing skills that date 
back to the Ming Dynasty. A high-quality dried bamboo shoot should be brown and 
slightly green in colour with a soft texture, uniform in size and without odour or mould. 
All these specific geographical and socio-cultural contexts combine to construct an image 
of “authentic, healthy, traditional” bamboo shoot products from Lin’an.
64
 
However, these images of high quality products based upon traditional bamboo-
growing methods and harvesting techniques jar with the reality of intensive farming and 
threaten to undermine the distinctiveness of the Lin’an industry. Environmental 
degradation and potential risks to food quality now go hand-in-hand,  
 
… owing to the application of massive amounts of chemical fertilizers, which increase the accumulation of 
potassium and phosphate in the soil. Forest degradation [is a risk] because the phosphate content level is 
above the safety level. By increasing the scale of bamboo cultivation … pest and disease problems 
[increase]. To tackle this problem, farmers apply more and more pesticides, even some prohibited 




Recognizing the threat to a key economic activity, Lin’an state actively intervened 
to promote more environmentally friendly bamboo shoot growing practices. Four major 
measures were implemented. First, the use and marketing of carbofuran in Lin’an county 
was prohibited in 2000. Second, soil samples were collected from 60 bamboo shoot 
cultivation areas to evaluate the level of sulphur, potassium and phosphates in the soil. 
Calculations were then done to ascertain the appropriate proportions of fertilizer 
ingredients. Fertilizer use and application is an important part of bamboo growing, 
discussed further below. Third, county-level hazard-free production standards for 
bamboo shoot cultivation were drafted based on those devised at the provincial and 
national levels. Lin’an Forestry Bureau worked with the Bamboo Shoot Production and 
Processing Association, bamboo shoot producers, processors, private technological 
extension firms, and research institutions (for example, Zhejiang Agricultural and 
Forestry University) to co-produce the standards for bamboo shoot production. Fourth, 
training workshops, exhibitions, booklets, and television programmes were produced to 
help bamboo shoot farmers learn about hazard-free production standards.
66
 Below, we 
explore how the local state works with its cooperatives to promote compliance with 
standards in order to maintain the competitive advantage of Lin’an’s bamboo shoot 
growers. 
 






Lin’an state applies its direct and indirect rules on promoting hazard-free production 
standards through collaboration with farmers’ cooperatives and demonstration 
households. For direct rules, both Lin’an state and the Forestry Bureau have the authority 
to control the production of bamboo shoots and the activities of farmers’ cooperatives 
through the Forest Law and Farmers’ Cooperative Law.
67
 Additionally, the Forestry 
Bureau provides technology extension services and monitors the production quality of 
bamboo shoots from individual farmers and cooperatives. To do so, Lin’an Forestry 
Bureau has established 50 testing points throughout the County to monitor the quality, 
heavy metal content, and chemical residue of bamboo shoots to ensure that they meet the 
Hazard-Free Production Standard. The county government and Forestry Bureau also need 
and use the cooperatives to increase the state’s influence on individual farmers’ practices. 
Through partnerships with fertilizer cooperatives, Lin’an Forestry Bureau can, on the 
one hand, trace the origin of fertilizers and, on the other hand, extend its indirect rule 
over farmers’ fertilizer usage and cultivation procedures by encouraging cooperative 
members to achieve food production standards. The cooperatives maintain good 
relationships with farmers through various niche services such as soil testing and 
fertilizer matching, and increasing the market network for bamboo shoots. Informal 
governance structures such as trust, negotiation and verbal agreements are common 
within a cooperative’s networks. Farmers’ cooperatives also sign bamboo shoot 
production contracts with individual farmers that protect prices, provide production 
training and workshops for farmers to maintain Hazard-Free and Zhejiang Forest Food 
Production Base Standards (see Figure 2). To further understand farmers’ cooperatives, 
the Yi Wei Fertilizer Cooperative (Yi Wei huafei hezuoshe 益微化肥合作社) and Kao 
Yuen Bamboo Shoot Cooperative (Gaoyuan zhusun hezuoshe 高源竹笋合作社) will be 
discussed in the following section. 
 






Source: Figure produced by the author – Kin Wing Chan 
 
 
Yi Wei Fertilizer Cooperative  
 
The Yi Wei Fertilizer Cooperative was established in 2012 and processes fertilizers for 
bamboo shoot producers. Members who buy the cooperative’s fertilizers obtain 
standardized-quality fertilizer and training in its application. The cooperative is small, 
with only 100 members. According to a director of the cooperative, it has three major 
functions: (1) soil testing and soil condition consultancy services, (2) the manufacturing 
and wholesaling of tailor-made non-toxic fertilizers, and (3) facilitating the Forestry 
Bureau’s technological extension services to promote fertilizer which meets the Hazard-
Free and Zhejiang Forest Food Production Base Standards. The director explained: 
 
Our cooperative conducts research on the optimum composition of chemical and organic substances in 
fertilizer to restore degraded soil and meet the Hazard-Free Production Standard … We collaborated with 
the Zhejiang Agricultural and Forestry University, Lin’an Forestry Bureau and the Agricultural Bureau’s 
soil testing stations to learn from their techniques to test the soil and learn their knowledge to blend the 








According to the same director, farmers repeated use of a fertilizer is based upon their 
experience; however, many farmers have little or no knowledge about the fertilizers that 
they use. According to the director: 
 
Some fertilizers are counterfeit and even toxic. The source of the fertilizers is difficult to trace. However, if 
farmers purchase fertilizers from our cooperative, at least they know where it comes from … We will let 
farmers try our products and let them see the improvement in their plantations. Once farmers see the 




For the cooperative, it is not only establishing a relationship of trust with farmers 
that matters; building close relationships with the Forestry Bureau also helps to promote 
its fertilizers to Lin’an farmers:  
 
I have been working in fertilizer manufacture and networking with Lin’an forestry officials for more than 
five years. Now, I have earned the trust from the bureau because my fertilizers increase farmers’ 
productivity and ameliorate the toxicity of the soil. Therefore, I can accompany the bureau’s technicians to 




The relationship between cooperative and state is portrayed as one of mutual benefit: the 
fertilizer cooperative needs the government’s endorsement and recommendations to 
promote its products on the market, and in turn, the fertilizer cooperative helps Lin’an 
state to make its farmers competitive.  
 
Kao Yuen Bamboo Shoot Cooperative 
 
The Kao Yuen Bamboo Shoot Cooperative was founded in 2009. It is a medium-sized 
cooperative, with around 1,300 bamboo shoot farmer members from across Lin’an 
county. Its members are responsible for about 7,500 hectares of bamboo land. The Kao 
Yuen cooperative also directly manages 225 hectares of land. The cooperative mainly 
buys bamboo shoots from its members, which it then sells on their behalf under the brand 
name Taihu yuantou 太湖源头, named after its location at the source of the Taihu River 
(see above). The cooperative has guided its members to adopt Hazard-Free and Zhejiang 
Forest Food Production Standards from seedling propagation and fertilizer use through to 
production processes. It does this by providing information on growing techniques. 
In addition, the cooperative ensures the quality of its members’ bamboo shoots in 
three other ways. First, it collaborates with the Yi Wei Fertilizer Cooperative by 
recommending to its members that they use the approved Yi Wei Cooperative fertilizers. 
In return, the fertilizer cooperative provides free soil testing services for the Kao Yuen 
Bamboo Shoot Cooperative’s members. Second, written contracts are used to maintain 
the Hazard-Free and Zhejiang Forest Food Production Standards. According to one 
director: 
 
Our bamboo shoots products have the brand name “Taihu yuantou” and farmers sign a contract with the 
cooperative because we have standardization in production procedures, fertilizers and pesticide usages. 




Third, by establishing links with demonstration households, the cooperative 





cooperative will put a sign up outside a demonstration household farm that reads “Ph. 
Praecox Shoot Plantation” to signify that those plots of land are meeting hazard-free 
production standards with the cooperative’s guidance. Also on the sign will be the name 
of the demonstration household, the types and descriptions of soil restoration, and the 
technology adopted (see Figure 3). Farmers interested in achieving hazard-free 
production standards can contact the demonstration households or the cooperative to 
receive a free consultation. According to one demonstration householder: 
 
More than 100 farmers consulted me for my cultivation techniques, farming schedules, and the types of 
fertilizers I use. There are around 30 farmers closely tied to me. Whenever they have problems, they come 




The cooperative not only encourages its own demonstration household farms to 
display its Hazard-Free Production Standard but also uses the networks of the 
demonstration households to promote its brands and attract interested farmers to join the 
Bamboo Shoot Cooperative. Like the Yi Wei Cooperative, the Kao Yuen Cooperative is 
working at the interface between the state and farmers. As the local state seeks to 
safeguard the economic interests of its farmers, it is increasingly turning towards the use 
of standards. Standards become a way of differentiating Lin’an products from their 
competitors. The protection of producers depends upon the local state being able to 
reassure urban consumers of the quality of products, and the cooperatives play a 
prominent role in ensuring that the requirements of standards are met. 
 
 
Figure 3: Sign Showing the Adoption of Hazard-Free and Zhejiang Forest Food 












Standards, like other neo-liberal practices such as auditing and certification,
73
 are 
becoming increasingly important policy instruments and a means to provide reassurance 
on quality where trading takes place.
74
 To gain a better insight into what standards mean 
for Chinese local environmental governance, it is important to make two points here. 
First, even when they have a stated ecological purpose, standards may not produce 
improvements in the quality of the bamboo growing environment, and second, in the 
Chinese context, the operation of standards is intertwined with the practices of the local 
state, a markedly different state of affairs from that which may be found elsewhere.
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These two points are elaborated below. 
Intensification of production can accelerate soil degradation and impair the 
carrying capacity of the land. For the local state, the increasing tensions between the 
promotion of economic growth and the avoidance of harmful exploitation of natural 
resources raise an increasingly pronounced conflict. We share the views of Linda Calvin 
et al. and George Lin that both the local state and producers look for short-term economic 
gains instead of addressing the deep-seated contradiction between resource exploitation 
and environmental limits.
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 Therefore, standardization is merely a short-term fix to 





the local state’s politico-economic territory is remade. To describe this phenomenon, we 
use the term “green cloak” since it suggests a specific governance logic of state territorial 
control over the production of nature. The local state engages with non-state actors to 
achieve superficial environmental efforts (for example, standards) to throw a “green 
cloak” over a continuing productivist model. A “green-cloak” requires state officials, 
academics, auditing bodies and experts to co-produce knowledge, such as showing 
quantitative changes to land surfaces and the number of green infrastructure projects, 
along with a set of rules to legitimize these green-looking development models. 
Our case study also reveals how the nature of the Chinese local state means that it 
is inextricably intertwined with both the organization and operation of standards, thus 
making it significantly different from what is expected, although perhaps not realized, in 
liberal democracies.
77
 This is because standards and the production of nature form part of 
the “territorial strategies” of the local state.
78
 The local state expands its territory and 
maintains its privileged governance through being able to exercise power over multi-
layered “space.” The local state is not limited to the physical space over which it can seek 
to exert control over raw material supplies; it also seeks control over the economic space, 
where it can enhance the competitiveness of the processors through the supply chain, as 
well as the political space in which it hopes to obtain the attention of the central state to 
boost its profile and economic opportunities. To be able to achieve this outcome, our 
research has shown how standardization engages with the local state, farmers’ 
cooperatives, forestry experts, bamboo shoot processors and extension services to co-
produce the knowledge necessary to realize these economic and political ambitions. 
At the local level, where so much policy delivery takes place, administrative 
competition may mean that there is more attention given to securing the “legitimacy” of a 
standard rather than on how that standard might help with the delivery of public policy. 
As shown in Table 2, national, provincial and county governments are involved in 
standard setting. One reading of the Table is that national-level standards are delivered in 
a relatively straightforward manner by subnational government. In practice, it is a more 
complex and dynamic situation with upscaling and downscaling and territorial 
competition taking place. An upscaling of standards can help the local state to secure 
administrative resources, inward investment and sympathetic policies.
79
 At a provincial 
level, the upscaling of the Zhejiang Forest Food Standard into a national forest food 
standard involves the transfer of power, creates the potential for economic benefits and 
the opportunity for promotion among government officials. At the same time, the 
upscaling and downscaling of standards is taking place in a context of interdepartmental 
politics (for example, between the agriculture and forestry departments) and this is 
resulting in a proliferation of standards.  
By examining a local state, we are able to show how it engages with key actors 
including farmers’ cooperatives, demonstration households and agricultural extension 
services to co-produce knowledge needed to develop standards as well as knowledge 
about the standards themselves. In our analysis of how standards are used in practice, we 
can see how they come to control bamboo shoot quality – a productive norm – and so 
become a governing tool for the local state to extend its direct and indirect rule over 
bamboo shoot producers. For direct rules, Lin’an state has the authority to control the 
production of bamboo shoots and the activities of farmers’ cooperatives through the 





the Chinese state. In its indirect rule, the county government and forestry bureau work 
with cooperatives, research institutions, and demonstration households to increase the 
state’s influence over individual farmers’ growing practices, and it is here that standards 
matter. By utilizing direct and indirect rules, the local state can use control and 
cooperation in its links with farmers. 
At present, compliance with standards is confined to a minority of bamboo shoot 
growers in Lin’an – that is, those who are best able to provide premium products. The 
local state in Lin’an aims at dispersing standardized bamboo shoot cultivation to a larger 
number of its farmers by demonstrating the economic value of adopting standards in 
growing. The highly networked nature of the Lin’an bamboo-growing community means 
that much learning is taking place via the cooperatives. The cooperatives become an 
agency to extend the arm of the local state to ensure the legitimacy of the standards it 
promotes and to raise the market recognition of Lin’an bamboo shoots. This should 
increase consumers’ confidence in Lin’an products, which will, of course, also benefit the 
bamboo shoot processors. As the local state generates additional economic value from 
bamboo shoot production and processing, it will also enlarge its economic territory. One 
challenge for the local state will be that as standards become normalized, then the local 
state may become less interested in promoting standards and become more of an auditor 
along the supply chain to ensure compliance with standards.
80
 It remains to be seen how 
such neo-liberal tendencies can be managed within the Chinese model of governance and 
points to the ongoing importance of the study of standards as a window into the dynamic 
nature of the relationships between the state and other actors. 
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